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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
CIVIL NO. 7998
OTHO R. MURPHY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
GRAND C~OUNTY, UTAH,
a body corporate and politic,
and MARGIE M. SHAFER,
County Clerk of Grand County, Utah, and Ex-Officio
County Auditor,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT
OF GRAND c·ouNTY, UTAH.

BRIEF OF DEFEN'DANTS

AI'~D

APPElLANTS.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 3, 1950, the Board of County Commissioners
of Grand co~1:aty, Utah, hereinafter referred to as "Board,"
~tt a n1eeting regularly held, fixed the salary of the county
attorney of Grand county, Utah, for the· term com1nencing
J·anuary 1, 1951, at $10.00 per annum. The fixing of the
salary was done pursuant to Section 19-13-15 U. C. A. 1943,
novv being s~~ction 17-16-15 U. C. A. 1953. Notice that the
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salary had been so fixed was given in the Tin1es-Inde~en
dent, a weekly newspaper published in Moab, Utah, ~~nrl
which has general circulation in Grand county. X o one protested the action of the board in so fixing the salary.
The general election for the election of county officers
for the year 1950 was held in Grand county on November
7, 1950, so that the salary of the county attorney was fixed more than six months prior thereto as required by law.
Within the time required by law for the filing for county
offices no person filed for the office of county attorne~,·,
an office Which was to be filled at the general election to
be held in November of that year, and on the ballot which
was prepared and used at said general election no name appeared thereon for the office of county attorney for Gr3nd
county.
On the day of the election the name of Otho R. Murphy, the plaintiff herein, was written in on the ballot for
the offioo of county attorney and he received a total of 44
votes for that office, which was the highest number of
votes received by anyone for the office of county attorney.
The total vote cast in Grand county at that general election was 870 votes.
On or about January 1, 1951, the plaintiff, pursuant
to such "write-in" vote, qualified for the office of count~·
attorney by taking his oath and furnishing his bond as 1\.:quired by law. On November 5, 1951 the plaintiff presented to the Board his claim for salary as county attorney
for the months of January through October, 1951, based on
the rate of $1,000 per annum, which was the salary previously fixed and paid to the county attorney of Grand
county and whose term had expired on January 1, 1951.
The Board refused to pay said claim for the reason that the
salary of the county attorney had been fixed by the Board
at its meeting of April 3, 1950 at $10 per annum and not
at $1,000 per annum. After the refusal of the Board to approve plaintiff's claim, he brought action in the District
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Court of Grand county. Utah, to recover his salary based
on the rate of $1,000 per annum. The District Court upheld
plaintiff's contention that he should be allowed the salary
of his predecessor in office, na.me1y, 1$1,000 per annum, and
hence this appeal from that decision.
S'fATEl\'IENT OF POINTS
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRE'D IN FINDING THAT
THE BOARD, IN FIXING THE SALARY OF THE COUNTY ATTORNEY OF GRAND COUNTY AT $10 PE'R ANNUM, FAILED TO EXERCISE A FAIR AND REASONABLE DISCRETION AND TI-IAT THE AMOU~~T SO FIXED AMO·UNTED TO NO CO·l\1PENSATION AT ALL, AND
THAT SUCH AC.TION OF THE BOARD W!AS CALCULATED TO DI8CO~URAGE ANYONE FROM SEE·KING
THE OFFICE OF COUNTY ATTORNE··y.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING FROM
DEFENDANTS ANSWER THE THIRD AND FO·URTI-I
DE:FENSES, NAMELY:
(A) THAT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ESTOPPE:D
FROM MAKING ANY CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS FOR ANY SALAR.Y OTHER THAN THE ANNUAL SALARY OF $10 PER YEAR AS FIXED BY LAvV.
(B) THAT THE D·EFENDP.tNT COUNTY AUDITOIR
IS PREVENTED BY SEiCTION 17-:-19-23 U. C. A. 1953
FROM DRAWING A WA·RRANT ON COUN'rY FUNDS
EXCEPT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF TH~ BUDGET
PASSED AND ADOPTE.D BY THE BO~ARD.
ARGUMENT
I

ONLY BOARD8 OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
ARE A UTHO~RIZE.D BY LAW TO FIX SALARIES OF
COUNTY OFFICE~R,S.
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The office of county attorney in this state is an office
created by Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution of
Utah. And the powers and duties of the county attorney
are set forth in Chapter 18, Title 17, U. C. A. 1953.
The power to fix salaries of county officers in this
state is given to the boards of county commissioners by
Sections 17-16-14 and 17-1~6-15 U. C. A. 1953. At the time
the salary of the county attorney was fixed by the Board
on April 3, 1950, Grand county was a class 4 county. The
maximum salary for the county attorney of a class 4 county at that time was $1800. The statute places no minin1um
as to salaries; this resting within the discretion of the
boards of county commissioners.
Section 17-16-14 U. C. A. 1953, as amended, provides
that "The annual salaries of the officers of all counties in
the state shall be fixed by the respective boards of county
commissioners at not to exceed the following amounts;''
and the section then sets forth the various amounts. Our
Suprem.e Court in the case of Johnson v Bankhead, (Utah
1951), 232 P 2d 372, said this about Section 17-16-14:
"There is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the
language of Section 19-13-14 (now Section 17-16-14)
above quoted. It expressly fixes only the maximum
within which the board of commissioners are limited in fixing the salary and expressiy places on such
boards the duty to fix such salary within such limits."
Under the ruling of Johnson v Bankhead, supra, it
has been established that the boards of commissioners
have the authority to fix the salaries of county officer~.
including that of county attorney, within the limits of Section 17-16-14.
The time when salaries of county officers are to be
fixed is provided for in Section 17-16-15, U. C. A. 1953, as
amended, which section reads as follows:
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"The board of county commissioners shall biennially, at a m€eting held at least six months prior
to the election of county officers, fix and determine
the salaries of county officers, for whon1 n1aximum
salaries are fixed, for the term next succ'(~eding; provided, that the salaries of such officers shall not be
diminished or increased for the term for vvhich they
were elected and shall have qualifi·~d; anj provided
further, that should any board fail to fix the salary of any of the county officers as provided in this
section, the salary of the predecessor of said officer whose salary has been fixed shall apply; provided, hovvever, said boards of county commi~sioners
may within six months of the effective date of this
act fix the salaries of county officers in amounts
which in their opinion will establish sufficient and
proper salaries for services rendered or to be rendered by officers whose salaries are so fixed; and
provided further that the maximum salaries for
county officers shall not exceed in amount the maximum salaries as set forth in section 17-16-14 hereof."
The defendants, through its Board, having fixed the
salary of the county attorney within the limits and vvithin
th'8 time allowed by the above quoted section, by what
right then had the trial judge to hold such action a nullity
and thus attempt to compel the defendants to pay to the
plaintiff a salary of $1000 per annum?
II
THE ACTION OF THE DEFENDANT BO·ARD IN
FIXING THE SALARY OF THE COUNTY ATTORNEY
CANN:OT BE SET ASIDE UNLESS THE\ EVIDENC'E
CLEARLY SHOWS AN ABUSE OF DISCR.ETION.
In this action the plaintiff at no time presented any
evidence to the trial court upon which the court could support its finding number 6, which reads:
"That in fixing the salary for the office of coun-
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6
ty attorney of Grand county at $10 per annum t.ht:
Board of County Commissioners -o.f said county failed to exercise a fair and reasonabl·e discretion in that
the sum so fixed was so sm.all as to amount to no
. compensation at all for the duties imposed bv la'Y
upon the office of county attorney and was Calculated to discourage anyone from seeking said office, or to limit aspirants to those willing to render
service gratuitously, in violation of the provisions
of Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution of
the state of Utah as amended, that 'A county atLorney shall be elected by the qualified voters of ea(' h
county ... ' "
No authority need be cited in support of the n1le which
requires that findings must be supported by the evidence.
The burden in this case was upon the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant Board at the time it fixed the salary of
the county attorney at $10 per annum abused its discretionary power. The plaintiff having failed to introduce any
evidence whatsoever in this action cannot now recover, for
the rule is that in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
there is always a presumption that the official acts of
county and other officers have properly been performed.
See 31 C. J. S., Section 146, pages 798-826.
In Cawsey vs Brickey, 82 Wash. 653, 14-~ P. 938,
an action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of
an order creating a game preserve and it was contended that the powers exercised by the body creating the preserve were arbitrarily exercised. Tht~
court failed to find sufficient evidence of arbitrary
action to warrant interference with the order creating the preserve and on the question of abuse of
power, the court said :
"It is also true that any discretionary power
may be abused, but an abuse will not be assumed in
the absence of clear and convincing evidence. Evrr~r
reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of
the regularity and good faith of official action.
Tainter v. Lucas, 29 Wis. 375; Quigley v. Phelps,
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74 \Y ~1__sh. 73, 132 Pac. 738."
"It will be presumed, in the absence of proof
to the contrary, that the board of county cornmissioners did its duty and informed itself of the facts,
and that the statements contained in its resolution,
with respect to the warrant indebtedness to be
funded, are true." Lloyd Corporation v. Bannock
County et al, (Idaho, 1933), 25 P. 2d 217.
"County Com1nissioners ~re presumed to do
their duty and to exercis€ fairly their discretion. If
they abuse their discretion, the people have a remedy at the polls, if no other be provided." State v.
Mills, (Mont. 1927) 261 P. 885.
"The county cornmissioners are public officers
and are presumed to properly discharge the duties
which the law imposes upon them..
"In the case of Bonaparte v. Nelson, 142 Okl.
54, 285 P. 100, 102, this court said: 'The excise
boards, like municipal boards and other public officers, are presumed to discharge the duties which
the law imposes upon them, and the same is true
relative to the board of county commissioners * * *
and in the absence of proof it will be presumed that
the officers, upon whom acts and duties are enjoined by law, performed those duties. This presumption continues in favor of the acts of such officers
until it is affirmatively shown by competent evidence to the contrary.' " Jackson v. Sadler et al, Old.
1935, 44 p. 2d 838.
The reading of the above authorities can lead to but
one conclusion, that is, that unless the evidence shows an
abuse of discretion on the part of the county commissioners, it will be presumed that they have discharged their
duty according to law and that they have acted fairly, impartially and in good faith. In . the case at bar, the plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence whatsoever with respect to an abuse of discretion or lack of good faith on the
part of the county comn1issioners in fixing the salary and
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having so failed to introduce any evidence, his case n1ust
fail for it will then be presumed, in the absence of such evidence, that the commissioners acted in good faith and did
not abuse their discretionary po'\ver granted to them by
law. In the absence of any evidence that the co1nmissioners
abused their discretionary power the court, in order to
find such an abuse of discretion in the instant case, would
be compelled to substitute its opinion and judgement for
that of the board of county commissioners v1hich, it is submitted, the court can not do.
In Reynolds v Board of Commissioners, 6 Tdaho 787,
59 P. 730 (1899) an action was brought by certain officers
of Oneida county against the Boar.d of Commissioners for
lowering certain salaries. The salaries fixed by the commissioners were as follows: Clerk of the District Court,
$900 per annum; Sheriff, $900 per annum; Superintendent
of Schools, $500 per annum and the Treasurer, $500 per annum. The District ·Court rendered judgament modifying
the order of the Board and increased the salaries above
the figures fixed by the Board. From this j udg•ment the
Board appealed to the Supreme court which, on appeal, reversed the lower court and had this to say :
"It is a well-settled rule that a power or function vested solely in one department, body, board,
or tribunal by express constitutional provisions cannot be delegated by such department, body, board,
or tribunal to another department, body, board, or
tribunal. The legislature cannot delegate the functions expressley vested in it by the constitution to
boards of county commissioners or to the judiciary .
. . . The duty which devolves upon the county commissioners under the act in question is a delicate,
and will generally be found to be a difficult, one.
They are called upon to exercise a judicial discretion,
and to act so as to carry out the intent of the stntute, with due regard for the rights and interests of
both officeholder and taxpayer. Their a('tion involvt\~
judicial discretion. They act, not as :1 legislative
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body, but quasi judicially. More or less trouble will
grow out of their actions under said statute. T~ey
have conflicting interests to consider and determinE\
On the one hand, officeholders will desire large salaries, while the taxpayers will desire the salaries
fixed as low as possible. But the interests of all both officehold€r and taxpayer - demand that salaries should be fixed at such sums as will reasonably compensate each officer for his time and labor,
taking into consideration the qualifications necessary to be possessed by each county officer, and the
responsibilities of his office. All of these matters
should be carefully investigated and determined by
the board of commissioners. The board should exercise the discretion vested in it with due re~~·ard
for the rights of all parties concerned.
"The action of the board should not be distuTbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion sho~rn,
which cannot be shown merely by the opinion of
the district court."
"Appellants argue that no law was violated by
the board, and that the respondents had no legal
rights to be violated at the time the salaries were
fixed; that \Vhatever legal right they have to compensation was created by the order appealed from.
We do not agree with this contention. The act in
question vests in each county officer in the state
the right to compensation which is, within the maximum and minimum prescribed, reasonable, con·"
sidering the circumstances surounding and affecting each office. Each taxpayer and officeholder has
the right to have the board of commissioners in his
county exercise its discretion in the matt-er of fixing
such salaries as will afford to each .officer reasonable compensation,. thus protecting public interests.
Each taxpayer also has a legal right to have the
county treasury protected against an abuse of the
discretion vested in the board, by way of profligate
extravagance. If the theory of the appellants be correct, that the action of the board is final and cannot be reviewed by the courts, the taxpayer in one
of the smaller counties may see the salaries fixed
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at the maximum, without regard to th·2 amot~nt of
labor to be performed, or other circumstances, contrary to public interests, and be pow-?rless to remedy the wrong. No such thing \vas contemplated.
The theory upon which the case of Stookey v. Board
(Idaho) 57 Pac. 312, - which is hereby affirmed,
- was decided, is that the boards of comn1issionera
must, within the discretion vested in them. allow
reasonable compensation by way of annual salaries,
when acting und€r the provisions of the act in quesrtion. It was only upon the theory that we could hold
said act to be general and not special legislation.
lJnder this theory, the act is uniform in its operation throughout the state. Under any other theor~r,
we would be compelled to hold it local and special,
and inhibited by the constitution. "While it seems
that the board of commissioners fixed th•c salaries
in question very low, and 'fNhile the amounts fixed
by the district court do not seem extravagant. yet
it does not sufficiently appear from the record before us that the board of commis-sioners abused its
discretion in making the order appealed from."
See also Criddle v Board of Con1missioners, 248 P. 465
(Idaho 1926); Etter v Board of Commissioners 255 P. 1095
(Idaho 1927) ; Dygert v Board of Commissioners, 129 P 2d.
660 (Idaho 1942) ; State ex rei Yeargin v Maschke, et al.,
155 P. 1064 (Wash. 1916); Benham v McLaughlin, 204 P.
1050 (Wash. 1922).; State, ex rel v Hinkle, 206 P. 942
(Wash. 1922).
There is no evidence in this case to show what motivated the Board in fixing the salary of the county attorney
at $10 per annum. The trial judge without any evidence before him found that the action of the Board was "calculated to discourage anyone from seeking said office, or to limit
aspirants to those willing to render service gratuitously."
The plaintiff is not now and at no time has he been a member of the bar of this or any other state. If we are to speculate, as the trial judge did, on what motivated the Board
in fixing the salary at so low a figure, can it not be said
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that theBoard had in mind the protection of the forgotten
taxpayer. It is possible that the Board anticipated that orJ.(~
not qualified to fulfill the office of county attorney would
attempt to be elected, as was the plaintiff. The Board was
under no obligation, legal or humanitarian, to provide out
of the taxpayers money a large salary in the nature of a
gift to one not able to perform the duties of county attorney.
In the absence of evidence showing an abuse of discretion the trial court cannot set up its j udgament against the
judgament of the Board as to what is a reasonable compensation for services to be performed by a county attor~
ney. It is to the judgament and diseretion of the boards
of county commission~rs, and not to trial judges, that the
legislature of this state left the decision and power in such
matters.
We quote from the leading case of Dillon v Whatcom
County, 41 P. 174 (Wash. 1895):
"It would seem that absolute discretion could
not be vested in a tribunal if it has not been vested
in the board of county commissioners by this section, so far as the hiring of extra help for county
officers is concerned; and, outside of the . construction which we would be compelled to place upon it
from the language of the law itself, the authorities,
it seems to us, are uniform on this proposition. Before proceeding to their investigation, in view of
some authorities which have been cited by the respondent, it is well to notice this distinction, v1hich
we think is frequently lost sight of in the discussion of such cases, viz. that the courts will interfere
to compel inferior tribunals to act or to 'exercise
their discretion in proper cases, when such tribunals claim that under the law they have no right to
act, the question of whether or not they have a
right to act being a legal question which the courts
will solve for the tribunals; but this must be distinguished from a case where the legislature has
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empowered the tribunal with discrE·l:ion, and
tribunal has exercised that discretion.

3~ 1 ch

"In such a case the courts have no rig-ht to SLl~'
stitute their judgement for the judgement of the
tribunal in which th'c discretion has bee:~. vested;
and we think an investigation of the authorities will
show that in all well-considered cases this distinction has been steadily kept in view. In this case, this
discretion having been vested by the legislature in
the board of county commissioners, and the question as to the necessity of this extrr. help ha ,.j ng
been submitted especially to th,air judgement, and,
as shown by the answer, they having exercised their
judgement and arrived at a conclusion, such a conclusion is final, and not subject to review by the
courts."
What i~ arbitrary or capricious action or an abuse of
discretion?
" .... The most that can be said of their action,
even from the respondent's point of view, is that
they erred in judgment. But this is not arbitrary
or capricious action. These terms, when used in this
connection, must mean willful and unreasoning
action, action without consideration and in disregard
of the facts and circumstances of the case. Action
is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, where there is
room for two opinions, however much it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion was reached."
Sweitzer v. Industrial Commission of Washington,
199 P. 724 (Wash. 1921).
In C'riddle v Board of Commissioners, 248 P. 465 (Idaho 1926) the court in discussing "abuse of discretion" said:
"The discretion in the matter is specifically
vested in the board, and an abuse of the board's discretion is not shown by the fact that the able trial
judge would have exercised the discretion differently had it been reposed· in him. Sullivan v. Board of
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Com'rs, 22 Idaho, 202, 125 P. 191. On the contrary,
an abuse of discretion occurs when the tribunal or
board, charged vvith its exercise, 'exceeds the
bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it
being considered.' Independent Steel & Wir•a Co. v.
New Mexico Cent. R. Co., 25 N.M. 160, 178 P. 842;
Sharon v. Sharon, 75 Cal. 1, 16 P. 345; Root v. Bingham, 26 S.D. 118, 128 N. W. 132 ..A.n 'abuse of discretion' * * * is really a discretion 'exercised to an
end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against,
reason and evidence.' Murray v. Buell, 7 4 vVis. 14, 41
N. W. 1010. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in
Northern Trust c·o. y. Snyder, 113 Wis. 516. 89 N.
W. 460, 90 Am. St. Rep. 867, said:
" 'Where it rests in the discretion of the county board to determine what is a reasonable compensation, the court should not revise their action in
the absence of clear evidence of such manifest abuse
of power and disregard of the statute as to show _
that the board failed to exercise a legal discretion.
* * *'."
With no evidence before the trial court wherein can
it be found in the record before this court that the defendant Board "exceeded the bounds of reason" or acted
"without consideration and in disregard of the facts and
circumstances of the case" when it fixed the salary of the
county attorney on that 3rd day of April, 1950, its action
being within the limits and power fixed and authorized by
law? .
If the defendant Board erred in judgment or did not
fix the salary sufficiently high enough to satisfy the plaintiff then as the Supreme Court of Washington said in Dillon v Whatcom County, supra:
"If it eventuates that the board has not exercised its discretion in a sensible way, or in such a
way as to subserve the best interest of the county,
the only remedy that the people have is the exercise of an intelligent choice at the polls."
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In Miles v Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 P. 534, at page 537,
it is said:
"The court has no jurisdiction to direct, by
mandamus, how the discretionary power, in the premises, vested in the board by the statute, shall be
exercised."
In this action the trial court found that the action of
of the Board was a nullity and ordered that the defendants
pay to the plaintiff a salary of $1000 per annum, which
was the salary of plaintiff's predecessor in office. We submit that the court is without power to substitute its judgment for that of the Board and increase the salary from $10
to $1000 per annum. If the Board abused its discretion then
it should be compelled to exercise it within reason and not
be required to accept the judgment of the court as to what
is a reasonable salary for the office of county attorney of
Grand county. In Merwin v Board of Co1nmissioners, 67 P.
285 (Colo. 1901), the Board fixed the salary of the deputy
district attorney at $1.00 per annum and he brought action
to 1"\~cover compensation for~' services rendered. In denying
plaintiff's claim the court said :

"* * * Another contention of plaintiff in error,
either in this or another case between the same parties (67 Pac. 1129), is that this is an equitable suit
on. the part of the plaintiff, not to review a discretionary action of the defendent in error, but for appropriate relief where the board has absolutely refused to exercise the power vested in it; that is to
say, the fixing by the board of the plaintiff's salary
at $1 a year is equivalent to no action at all, and
therefore the judgment should be vacated, and another one rendered for a reasonable sum in his favor. This contention is not good. If the action t<1ken
by the board is in legal effect, no action at all, then
the proper remedy is mandamus to con1pel action,
not an action to recover on a quantum meruit. The
court, might, in such a case, compel the board to
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take action, but not to act in a particular \vay. And
this leads us to remark that, as a conclusive reason
why plaintiff is not entitled to maintain this action,
the legislature has not attempted to confer upon
the courts i urisdiction to <}8termine the an1ount of
the compen"sation to which he is entitled. ·The general assembly itself has not fixed for deputy district
attorneys, as such, any fees, or prescrib€d any definite salary, but, on the contrary, has conferred upon the county commissioners power to fix the salary
of the class to which plaintiff belongs at a sum not
exceeding $1,500 a year. So that while, if the r..n.atter could properly be brought before us for review~
we might agree with the counsel that the action
of the commissioners i.n fixing plaintiff's salary at
1$1 a year was wholly inexcusable, and entirely inadequate, still the fact that our judgment was different from theirs would not authorize us on this
hearing to substitute our judgment for theirs, and
enter judgment in an amount which we deemed a
reasonable compensation. Where one ent-ers into a
public office for which no compensation has been
provided by law, he is presumed to give his s•2rvices;
and where such compensation is conditional, as here,
his right thereto does not attach until the condition
is fulfilled or performed. 13 Cent. Law J. 444, and
cases cited; People v. Superior Ct. of City of New
York, 5 Wend. 115; Garfield Co. v. Leonard, 26 Colo.
145, 57 Pac. 693. * * * "
"In the absence of a statute to the contrary, or
an abuse of discretion, an order of a ·county board
or other tribunal fixing or allowing compensation
is not subject to review by the courts. Furthermore,
under some statutes, even though an appeal can be
taken, the court cannot itself fix the compensation,
the only question for its determination being whether the board in making the order abused its discretion, and the court must affirm, modify, or revers€ the order, make findings and conclusions, and
remand the matter with instructions to the board
to make an order accordingly." 20 C. J. S. page 935.
We submit there is no statutory authority in our state
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by which the courts in such cases as the one at bar can substitute their judgment for that of the board of county commissioners in the fixing of salaries of county officers. St1eh
power is given only to the boards by law, and in the absence of proof showing an abuse of discretion, bad faith or
arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the board,
can the courts set such action aside. No such proof being
shoW!n by the plaintiff his case must fail.
"The general rule of law is that public officials
can only claim compensation for services rendered
·where the compensation is provided by law, and that
where no compensation is so provided the rendition
of such services is d~amed to be gratuitous." State
ex rel. Matson v O·'Hern, 65 P. 2d 619 (Mont. 1937).
See also Maricopa County v Rodgers, 78 P. 2ct 989,
(Ariz. 1938) ; McAuliffe v Kane, 128 P. 2d 932, (Cal. 1942);
Board of Commissioners v Leonard, 57 P. 693 (Colo. 1899) ;
1-Iillman v Chmelka, 195 P. 2d 945 (Colo. 1948) ; Merwin "
Board of Commissioners, 67 P. 285 (Colo. 1901).
III

THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM
MAKIN.G ANY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR
ANY SALAR.Y OTHER THAN THE SUIY.l FIXED ACCORDING TO I_JA W BY THE DEFENDANT BOARI).
/

The salary as fixed by t:he Board at $10 per annum
was given notice by the Board to the public in the TimesIndependent, a weekly newspaper publi.shed in Moab, Grand
county, in the April 6, 1950 issue. This was notice to the
general public, including plaintiff, what the salary of ·n~c
county attorney \vould be for the term commencing January 1, 1951. The plaintiff being charged with such noticl'
of the salary so fixed permitted his name to be written in
on the ballot at the general election of November 7, 1950,
for the office of county attorney. It is submitted that under such circumstances that the plaintiff should be estop-
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ped from making demand for a salary of $1000 per annun1
on the ground that the action of the Board was a nullity
and was calculated to prevent persons from seeking the
office. At the time the salary was fixed the plaintiff nor
any one else protested the action of the Board. It is thel"~-·
fore assumed, in absence of evidence to the contrary, that
the salary so fixed met the approval of the people of Grand
county and that the Board acted within its authority.
Plaintiff, knowing what the salary 'vas, should not now
complain about bad faith or abuse of discretion on the rart
of the Board.

IV
THE DEFENDANT COUNTY AUDITOR IS PREVENTED BY SECTION 17-19-23, U. C. A. 1953 TO DRAVl
AWY vVARRANT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF EXCEPT AS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE BUDGET
PASSED BY DEFENDANT BOARD.
Section 17-19-23, U. C. A. 1953 reads as follows:
"County auditors shall not draw warrants on
county funds except in accordanc'2 Yvith and v;ith;n
the limits of the budget duly passed by the board of
county commissioners."
The budget of the defendant for the year 1951, as
adopted according to law, appropriated the sum of $10 as
salary for the office of county attorney. Under the above
quoted section the defendant auditor is prevented from
drawing a warrant in favor of the plaintiff in excess of
such amount.
In Williams v Board of Commissioners, 282 P. 867,
(Idaho, 1929) the court said :
"The conclusion is inevitable that the salarv
which respondent is attempting to recover not having been included in the budget for the year April
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1, 1928, to April 1, 1929, and not being emergency
or mandatory charge *** could not lawfully have
been paid by the board."
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the trial court should have denied
plaintiff relief for the reason that the record in this case
contains nothing to warrant the conclusion that the action
of the defendant Board w.as tantamount to the destruction
of the office of county attorney.
In the absence of a showing by the plaintiff of fraud,
bad faith, abuse of discretion or arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the defendant Board to whom the power
to fix county officers salaries is given, the courts cannot
consider the matter of the Board in so fixing such salaries
and thus substitute their judgment for that of the Board.

Respectfully submitted
MITCHELL MELICH
Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants.

July, 1953.
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